Summary of "The Logic of Political Survival"

Core Puzzle and Framework

"The Logic of Political Survival" addresses a fundamental paradox in politics: leaders who promote peace and prosperity often lose power quickly, while those who create corruption and misery frequently endure in office. For example, Winston Churchill was voted out immediately after WWII despite his successful wartime leadership, while Mobutu Sese Seko remained in power for 32 years despite impoverishing Zaire.

The authors propose the "selectorate theory" which rests on two key institutional variables:

1. The selectorate (S): Those with a formal role in choosing leaders
   • Example: In modern democracies, all eligible voters; in Saudi Arabia, just the royal family
2. The winning coalition (W): The subset whose support is essential for a leader to maintain power
   • Example: In the United States, roughly half the voters; in North Korea, a small circle of military and party elites

The Loyalty Mechanism

The "loyalty norm" (the W/S ratio) is crucial to understanding political behavior. It represents the probability that a coalition member will remain in a successor's coalition:

• Small W/S ratio (autocracies): Coalition members face high risk of exclusion if a new leader takes power
  • Example: In the Soviet Union, Communist Party membership was restricted to about 10% of the population, with only a fraction in the winning coalition. This made access to special privileges highly valuable and defection extremely risky.
• Large W/S ratio (democracies): Lower risk of exclusion, weaker loyalty
  • Example: In democracies, voters have roughly a 50% chance of being in any future winning coalition, making defection less costly.

This creates an "incumbency advantage" - sitting leaders can credibly promise future benefits that challengers cannot guarantee.

Resource Allocation and Public Policy

Public vs. Private Goods

• Small coalition systems: Leaders provide private benefits (like direct payments, monopoly rights, or special privileges) to their small coalition
  • Example: Ferdinand Marcos funneled billions into Swiss bank accounts while giving key military and business supporters exclusive economic privileges in the Philippines
• Large coalition systems: Leaders must provide public goods (like education, healthcare, infrastructure) as private rewards become too costly to distribute
  • Example: After Britain's electoral reforms expanded the franchise in the 19th century, policy shifted from private member bills benefiting aristocrats to broad public policies benefiting the general population

Economic Performance and Corruption

• Tax rates: Small coalition systems have higher tax rates to fund private rewards
  • Example: Pre-revolution France had extractive taxation benefiting aristocrats while hampering economic growth
• Economic growth: Large coalition systems show higher, more predictable growth
  • Example: South Korea's economic miracle accelerated after democratization in the 1980s
• Kleptocracy: Small-coalition/large-selectorate systems create the greatest opportunities for theft
  • Example: Leopold II of Belgium illustrates this perfectly - he promoted economic reforms in Belgium (large W) while brutally exploiting the Congo as his personal property (small W)

War and Peace

The theory explains patterns of conflict and peace through the lens of political survival:

• War effort: Large-coalition leaders commit more resources to war because policy failure means removal
  • Example: Democratic countries like the US and UK mobilized over 20% of their GDP for WWII, while Nazi Germany mobilized much less despite Hitler's rhetoric
• War initiation: Large-coalition leaders only fight when highly confident of victory
  • Example: The US carefully selected its interventions in Panama and Grenada where victory was certain, while avoiding direct confrontation with the USSR
• The "selectorate peace": Large-coalition systems rarely fight each other because both would try hard, making victory uncertain and costly
  • Example: Despite tensions, the US and Western European democracies have not had military conflicts since becoming democracies

Political Survival Patterns

• Leadership tenure: Small-coalition leaders survive longer in office (average 5.69 years vs. 3.56 for large-coalition)
  • Example: Fidel Castro ruled Cuba for nearly 50 years while maintaining a small winning coalition
• Survival patterns over time: Small-coalition leaders face high initial risk but become more entrenched over time
  • Example: Stalin faced significant threats in his early years but became increasingly secure as he purged potential rivals
• Policy performance and survival: For large-coalition leaders, good economic performance is crucial; for small-coalition leaders, private goods provision matters more
  • Example: Poor economic performance contributed to Jimmy Carter's defeat, while Robert Mugabe maintained power in Zimbabwe despite economic collapse by rewarding military and party elites

Institutional Change and War

Domestic Preferences for Institutions

Different groups prefer different institutional arrangements:

• The disenfranchised prefer large W/large S (democracy)
• Selectorate members not in the coalition have mixed preferences
• Coalition members prefer either small W/small S (monarchy/junta) or large W/large S (democracy)
• Leaders always prefer small W/large S (rigged-election autocracy)

Oppression and Resistance

• Oppression: Small-coalition/large-selectorate systems use the most oppression
  • Example: Stalin's Great Terror eliminated potential rivals within the Communist Party
• Revolution: Occurs most often in small-coalition systems
  • Example: The French Revolution overthrew a monarchy with a small coalition that heavily taxed the population

War Aims and Nation Building

• Territorial acquisition: Small-coalition states focus on territorial conquest for resources
  • Example: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait under Saddam Hussein was driven by oil resources
• Policy goals: Large-coalition states focus on policy changes in defeated states
  • Example: The US focused on democratization in Japan after WWII
• Nation building: Victorious large-coalition states often strategically impose small-coalition governments on defeated states to ensure compliance
  • Example: The US initially established autocratic control in post-WWII Japan and Germany before gradually allowing democratization

Promoting Peace and Prosperity

The authors develop the "Hobbes Index" to measure how far nations have progressed from the "nasty, brutish, and short" state of nature. They find:

• Institutional performance: Large-coalition, democratic governments score highest
  • Example: Countries like Iceland, Canada, Japan, and Australia consistently rank at the top
• The problem of fake democracies: Nominal democracies with patronage systems operate like small-coalition systems
  • Example: In parts of India like Bihar, bloc voting through patron-client relationships effectively transforms a large-coalition democracy into a functional small-coalition system

The Central Paradox

The book's most sobering conclusion is that "bad policy is good politics" for leaders in small-coalition systems. This explains why we observe persistent poverty, corruption, and oppression in many parts of the world despite widespread knowledge about policies that could improve human welfare.

The theory suggests that institutional reform to expand winning coalitions is necessary for sustainable improvements in governance and human welfare - it's not enough to simply replace leaders or provide aid without changing the fundamental incentives they face.